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Rather than reclaim global dominance by outspending and
overpowering new contenders, U.S. planners should instead simply
not contest many of Beijing’s and Moscow’s costly efforts to expand
their networks of clients.
by Alexander Cooley  Daniel Nexon
The Trump administration may be over, but its emphasis on “great power
competition” is likely here to stay. The Washington establishment believes that
Moscow and Beijing are engaged in a worldwide campaign to undermine U.S.
power, security, and prosperity—one makes ample use of non-military
instruments such as overseas investment, the creation of new international
organizations, political support for authoritarian regimes and anti-democratic
forces, and “sharp power” aimed at undermining pro-American regimes.
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Prominent members of the Biden administration have already used the
language of great-power competition, and even those who are uncomfortable
with the idea of fighting a “New Cold War” will face immense pressure to
aggressively counter growing Russian and Chinese international influence.
We already have a pretty good idea of what it looks like when the U.S. treats
great-power competition as its foreign-policy lodestar. For example, the United
States Development Finance Cooperation recently agreed, on behalf of the
government of Ecuador, to repay billions of dollars of outstanding Chinese
loans. What did Washington get for bailing out Quito and its Chinese creditors?
A commitment from Ecuador to expel Chinese companies from its
communications network. Why was Ecuador in need of a bailout? The
outstanding debt stemmed from a 2008 Chinese loans-for-energy deal, one that
provided a lifeline to Ecuador when it defaulted on its international bond
payments—in part to escape a dollarization policy that interfered with then-
President Rafael Correa’s plans to increase social-welfare spending.
As competition for influence between the United States and China continues to
intensify, we can expect to see more governments to use that competition to
their advantage. This poses some real risks for the United States. Waging an all-
out global effort to outbid rivals will prove extremely expensive. Given its fiscal
position and pressing domestic needs, it is simply unrealistic to expect that the
United States can and will outbid Beijing—and its massive Belt and Road
Initiative—in every country and every region. Keep in mind that one of the
11/18/21, 11:43 AMTo Re-Establish U.S. Influence, Biden Should Play Rope-a-Dope, Not Compete Globally
Page 5 of 7https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/buzz/re-establish-us-influence-biden-should-play-rope-dope-not-compete-globally-177380
underlying drivers of BRI spending is neither profitability nor geopolitical
ambition, but to simply provide outlets for excess Chinese capacity, especially
in its construction sector.
Moreover, as the incumbent superpower, the United States must balance an
extensive network of partnerships and alliances composed of states with diverse
interests and identities. This is one of Washington’s major power-political
advantages over rising powers like China. The downside is that relatively
unencumbered challengers can, in geopolitical terms, float like a butterfly and
sting like a bee. China and Russia can exploit frictions between states in the
U.S. network and target those governments that remain outside of it. Beijing
and Moscow can court autocrats who are disgruntled with Western pressure;
support regimes, such as Iran, that view the United States as a threat; and pick
off countries that Washington had considered too strategically unimportant to
expend significant resources on, such as Tajikistan, Sudan, and Madagascar.
Does Chinese or Russian patronage suddenly make such countries strategically
important? Only if U.S. officials convince themselves that to “win” the new era
of competition they must always and everywhere compete.
This would be a huge mistake. Biden faces an international order far different
than it was in the wake of the Soviet collapse, when the United States and its
core liberal-democratic allies were the only significant sources of international
patronage and international order. Now, emerging powers increasingly shape
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the agendas and staffing of long-standing international organizations. Beijing
and Moscow have established new regional organizations like the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union to advance their
economic and security agendas. Liberal democracy continues its global retreat,
challenged by counter-democratic and illiberal norms under the guise of
traditional values, populist anti-globalism, and civilizational diversity.
Rather than reclaim global dominance by outspending and overpowering new
contenders, U.S. planners should instead adopt a strategy of geopolitical “rope-
a-dope:” they should simply not contest many of Beijing’s and Moscow’s costly
efforts to expand—and manage—their networks of clients. China’s investments
have brought much-needed funds for some valuable development projects,
which is a net global good. But Beijing has also sunk money into “white
elephants” and fueled local graft and corruption—leaving China with a
questionable, or even negative, return on its investments in the face of
disillusionment and political blowback among recipients.
The United States can often afford to stand back because most of the "gaps" in
the U.S. alliance and partnership network exist for good reason: the countries
in question don’t matter to U.S. security. Washington can, and should, conserve
its resources for holding onto indispensable allies and partners. Otherwise, the
most important thing that the Biden administration can do to better position
the United States for “great-power competition” is to restore the U.S. brand as a
promoter of accountable governance and the benefits of an open society.
11/18/21, 11:43 AMTo Re-Establish U.S. Influence, Biden Should Play Rope-a-Dope, Not Compete Globally
Page 7 of 7https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/buzz/re-establish-us-influence-biden-should-play-rope-dope-not-compete-globally-177380
Source URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/re-establish-us-influence-biden-should-play-rope-dope-not-
compete-globally-177380
Despite years of mismanagement, the United States is still holding on to its
leading position in technological innovation, higher education, the
international service sector, and global anti-corruption policies. If Biden—
perhaps with the help of sympathetic Republicans—can “build back better” then
Washington won’t even need to outbid its rivals in order to outcompete them. It
will merely need to have confidence that its product will, over the long term,
prove more attractive than that offered by its geopolitical competitors.
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